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OUR PRODUCT LIABILITY SYSTEM: AN EFFICIENT
SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM
FRANK J. VANDALL*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a substantial volume of material has been written
contending that the American civil justice system is out of control, ' jury
awards have improperly reached astronomical proportions 2 and the
American penchant for tort litigation, particularly product liability tort
litigation, is on the verge of causing the ruination of the business and
manufacturing communities, if not the entire republic. 3 The writers of
these gloomy materials claim, in alarmist fashion, that product liability
and medical malpractice litigation has delivered the "insurance crisis."
This "crisis" is evidenced by the diminished availability of insurance in
certain areas and for certain activities, and by the dramatically increased
rates charged for insurance coverage.4 It is asserted that these increased
rates have compelled physicians to leave the medical profession, forced
small businesses to close their doors, pushed major manufacturers into
bankruptcy and priced many types of insurance beyond the reach of
those who need it.5 The most frequent and popular suggestion offered
by the alarmists as a cure for this dilemma is a call for far-reaching tort
reform, including comprehensive reformation in the product liability
area.
6
This article begins by suggesting that available data is woefully in-
sufficient to support such catastrophic reform; hard facts are simply not
available to support the notion that a real problem exists in the product
liability insurance area. 7 It suggests that since most goods and services
* Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A., 1964, Washington and Jefferson Col-
lege; J.D., 1967, Vanderbilt University; LL.M., 1968, S.J.D., 1979, University of Wiscon-
sin. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Deborah
Mann, Joice Elam, James L. Hickey and Jane Tuttle.
1. See, e.g., Address by William M. McCormick, Chairman and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, entitled The American Tort System: A Time to
Rebalance the Scales ofJustice (Jan. 7, 1986), repnnted in 52 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Feb.
15, 1986, at 267.
2. Id. at 268.
3. See Molotsky, Drive to Limit Product Liability Grows as Consumer Groups Object, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 1, 1986, at 32, col. 1.
4. See Ross, Reforms, Profits Swallow Up Insurance Crisis, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1987, at 2,
col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Ross].
5. See generally S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report]. For a discussion on manufacturers' liability and bankruptcy, see Couric, The
A.H. Robins Saga, 72 A.B.A.J. 56 (1986).
6. See Rose and Abbott, Federal Liability Law Would Lessen Uncertainty, Legal Times,
July 9, 1984, at 15; Mayer, Change Urged In Product Liability Law; Product Liability Laws Over-
haul Being Sought, Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at D7; see also Reed and Watkins, Product
Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L. REv. 389 (1984).
7. See infra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
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have increased in price over the last fifteen years, it should not be sur-
prising that the price of insurance has also increased. The article's sec-
ond section, an economic analysis of the alleged "crisis," suggests that
the free market - rather than government regulation or tort reform -
may be more helpful in lowering the price and increasing the availability
of insurance. 8 Section three examines our American system of tort re-
covery based upon strict liability. It explores the underlying rationale
for using a strict liability analysis in product liability actions and suggests
that abolition of this system could lead to the establishment of socialized
medicine as a means of compensating victims. The section advocates
manufacturer responsibility, not government largesse, as the appropri-
ate means for compensating product liability victims. It concludes that
strict liability is less expensive than other alternatives. 9 The fourth sec-
tion evaluates the inadequacies of several product liability reform pro-
posals.' 0 The final section examines the benefits derived from "loss
shifting."'' It concludes that the American product liability system in its
current form is working well and provides a relatively inexpensive mech-
anism for resolving the complicated tensions which frequently arise
when a product liability tort is committed.
I. CRISIS OR FICTION? THE PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE PROBLEM
As with any public policy issue, proponents and opponents repre-
sent divergent interests and points of view. This phenomenon fre-
quently results in confusion and makes understanding and resolution of
the issue in question more difficult. To some extent, this helps to de-
scribe the confusing and sometimes contradictory nature of the product
liability insurance problem. There is no question that during recent
years, impetus for reform in the product liability area has reached a fe-
ver pitch. 12 Manufacturers, suppliers and insurance companies argue
that the product liability insurance problem is in need of attention and
reform. 13 High insurance rates may force some manufacturers out of
business. 14 Claiming that a product liability insurance "crisis" exists,
8. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 6.
13. The American Insurance Association, which represents the interests of prop-
erty/casualty insurance companies, found that by 1986 the number of federal product lia-
bility suits had increased by 750% since 1974. During the same period of time, the
average jury verdict in product liability cases had increased from under $400,000 to over
$1.8 million. Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S. 2760 Before the Committee on the Judici-
ary of the United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 666 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]
(statement of Peter A. Lefkin, Counsel, Am. Ins. Ass'n). However, these allegations are
not new. SeeJohnson, Products Liability "Reform ": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REV. 677,
678 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Johnson] (manufacturers faced with either paying dramati-
cally increased fees for product liability insurance or going out of business due to the
product liability insurance "crisis").
14. The introduction to Senate Bill 2760, proposed in 1986, provides:
The inefficiency and unpredictability of the product liability system have been
linked to the increasing cost and unavailability of liability insurance. An increas-
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the insurance industry has supported the move for legislative protection
of manufacturers' interests.'
5
As far back as 1977, the Interagency Task Force on Product Liabil-
ity, under the direction of the United States Department of Commerce,
studied a variety of problems in the product liability area. 16 The Task
Force attempted to define the product liability coverage problem and to
provide insight into possible legislative reforms that would ease the
plight of manufacturers faced with going out of business due to high
insurance rates. The study revealed that manufacturers of industrial
chemicals and certain consumer goods, such as pharmaceuticals, power
mowers, ladders and medical devices, are most severely affected by
heightened insurance costs. 17 The Task Force also examined the availa-
bility and affordability of insurance, both in small and large manufactur-
ing firms, and found that some small businesses are forced to choose
between purchasing products liability insurance at very high premiums
or foregoing the protection of insurance entirely.' 8 The Task Force
concluded that the product liability insurance problem was not of "cri-
sis" proportions. 19
The Task Force identified three primary causes for the rise in prod-
uct liability insurance premiums: the insurance industry's rate-making
procedures, the tort-litigation system, and unsafe manufacturing prac-
tices employed by those seeking to be insured. 20 Several less substantial
causes also were identified, including consumer and worker awareness,
increases in the number and complexity of products, product misuse
and inflation. 2 1 Certainly all of these factors have impacted the cost of
product liability insurance premiums, but inflation is frequently over-
ing number of companies, whether they make such products, are [sic] sporting
goods, textile manufacturing equipment, machine tools, medical devices or vac-
cines, cannot buy adequate insurance coverage. Some have had their insurance
cancelled or have experienced reduced coverage with increased deductibles at
higher prices. Others cannot obtain coverage at any price.
Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2.
15. Although the American Insurance Association supports product liability reform, it
found that Senate Bill 2760 was incomplete in developing solutions to the product liability
insurance problem. The Association has placed substantial blame on the legal system for
the current problems in the product liability area. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 666, 670.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT (1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT]. The Task Force also pub-
lished a seven volume legal study that was prepared by independent contractors as part of
the study of product liability problems. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY (1977) [hereinafter TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY].
17. Schwartz, Proposed Remedies for the American Problem: U.S. Governmental Activity, 29
MERCER L. REV. 437, 440 (1978) (setting forth a summation of Task Force findings and
noting that the problem of increased cost of product liablity insurance is more severe for
smaller firms in all industries because, unlike a large manufacturer which produces goods
in large quantities, a small firm may not be able to pass on the cost of product liability
insurance in the price of its goods). Mr. Schwartz was chairman of the Interagency Task
Force on Product Liability.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1-20.
21. Id. at 1-29 to 1-31.
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looked as a contributing factor, and is especially deserving of further
discussion.
Increased insurance rates are not so alarming when considered in
relation to inflationary trends evident in other industries and for other
types of goods and services. For example, in 1972, the price of a basic
Datsun 1200 was $2,051.22 By 1987, the price of a basic Nissan Sentra,
a successor to the Datsun 1200, was $6,199.23 This represented a 300%
price increase over fifteen years. Moreover, between 1967 and 1983, the
Consumer Price Index for all goods increased by almost 200%.24 And,
during that same sixteen year period, hospital room rates increased over
500%!25 It is not surprising that insurance rates have doubled or trip-
led over the years when the cost of virtually all other services and goods
have also doubled or tripled. When manufacturers, sellers and insur-
ance companies argue for tort reform, they rarely mention the substan-
tial impact inflation has had on this issue.
Another confusing area is that of insurance company profitability.
Although the insurance industry claims that the current tort system is
causing bankruptcy throughout the industry, recent earnings by the in-
surance industry are impressive and appear to be at an all-time high.
Figures complied by A. M. Best Company, an independent firm that fol-
lows the insurance industry, show that in 1985, property/casualty stock
prices rose fifty percent, twice the rate of increase for the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. 26 In the first quarter of 1986, these stocks were up
an additional twenty-six percent.2 7 According to the Insurance Services
Office, which advises insurance carriers on rate setting, operating profits
of insurance companies tripled during the first nine months of 1986,
compared to the same period in 1985.28 Earnings rose to $3.6 billion,
up from $1.2 billion in 1985.29 If a "crisis" within the insurance indus-
try ever existed, current profitability reports would suggest that it now
has passed.
In attempting to assess the nature of the insurance problem, it be-
comes clear that few facts are available from the insurance companies.
30
Information is not generally available as to the amount of insurance
22. Subcompact Cars, Datsun 2-door, CONSUMER REP., Apr. 1972, at 224, 226.
23. Small Cars, Nisan (Datsun) Sentra 2-door, CONSUMER REP., Apr. 1987, at 211, 213.
24. Health Care Costs and Their Effects on the Economy, 1984: Hearings Before the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, Congress of the United States, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1984) (statement of
James Hacking, Assistant Legislative Counsel, American Association of Retired Persons).
25. "The tremendous growth in health care expenditures is expected to continue on
into the future. By 1990, total health spending is expected to reach some $758 billion,
more than double where it is today." Id.
Damage awards in personal injury suits also have increased over the last few years. A
portion of the increase is likely due to higher medical expenses.
26. Scherffius, The Insurance Crisis: Causes and Cures From a Plaintiffs Lawyers Perspective,
ATLANTA LAW. 15, 17 (Fall 1986) (quoting figures from A.M. Best Co.).
27. Id.
28. Ross, supra note 4.
29. Id.
30. Hearings, supra note 13, at 305 (statement of Robert L. Habush, President, Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America).
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sold, the income generated from premiums, the amount paid out in
claims and, most importantly, the amount made as profit. 3 1 This lack of
data from insurance companies makes it unclear whether an insurance
"crisis" truly exists. 32
II. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE "CRIsIS"
Assume that product liability insurance rates have increased dra-
matically, and that some manufacturers and sellers have been unable to
obtain insurance. As a result, they have been forced to go out of busi-
ness. Many question what should be done about this situation.
The real question is - should anything be done? Economists would
submit that no action should be taken; instead, the influences of the
marketplace should be permitted to eventually provide an appropriate
remedy. 33 This type of economic analysis, as applied to manufacturers
and sellers unable to obtain insurance, might be more easily understood
by way of analogy to the gasoline shortage of the middle-to-late
seventies.
34
During that period, the price of gasoline went up dramatically.
People altered their driving habits by driving less and taking vacations
closer to home. 35 Automobile manufacturers - especially the Japanese
- responded with smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. 3 6 At the same time,
many oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United States,
England and Mexico, expanded their drilling for, and production of, oil
and gas.
The result has been that much more oil is currently available and
the price of oil has decreased. The natural influences of the marketplace
have worked, and the oil shortage "crisis" has been resolved.
Similarly, some economists might recommend that the product lia-
bility insurance crisis be handled the same way - by allowing the market
forces of supply and demand to establish the appropriate price for insur-
ance. 37 If insurance prices continue to rise, new producers will inevita-
bly enter the marketplace to sell insurance. In fact, this is already
occurring. In several states, cooperative groups of local physicians are
providing medical malpractice insurance for their members. 38 Indeed,
31. Id.
32. In declaring unconstitutional a statute limiting awards in medical malpractice
suits, an Illinois judge found that there was no empirical data to support the claim that a
medical malpractice insurance crisis exists. 5 LAW. ALERT 10 (1986) (quoting from Bernier
v. Burris, No. 85 CH 6627 (Cook County Cir. Ct., II1., Dec. 19, 1985)).
33. See M. & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 13-18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fried-
man]; A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS I I (1983); R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 208, 485 (2d ed. 1977); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 368-70 (11 th
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Samuelson].
34. See, e.g., The Big Travel Mess, NEWSWEEK,June 18, 1979, at 22;A Global Deal on Prices,
TIMEJan. 14, 1974, at 15; The Painful Change to Thinking Small, TIME, Dec. 31, 1973, at 18.
35. Hitting the Road Again, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1982, at 55; The Holiday Jitters, NEWS-
WEEK, May 28, 1979, at 67.
36. Every major manufacturer now has at least one small, fuel-efficient model.
37. See Friedman, supra note 33.
38. James R. Posner, an insurance expert, reports:
1988]
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these co-ops are "reasonably successful."'3 9 With this heightened com-
petition, insurance premiums invariably will become lower. Eventually,
the insurance price and availability "crisis" will have resolved itself.
40
Other questions have been raised about what should happen to
manufacturers and sellers that cannot obtain insurance. The economic
response lies in whether the companies are profitable or not. If they are
profitable, an insurance company will eventually offer them insurance,
most likely at high rates. If companies are not profitable, insurance will
be more difficult to obtain because premiums may be out of reach for
such marginally-operated companies. For companies that are not profit-
able because of high risks and large losses in product liability lawsuits,
increased insurance rates are the market's way of proclaiming their
products as too risky or dangerous.
Eventually in these high-risk situations, the issue focuses on
whether certain products are necessary to society despite their inordi-
nate risks. Where these questions arise, and where private sector insur-
ance coverage is not available, the government may be called upon to
decide whether to support companies that are struggling due to their
production of necessary, high-risk products. For example, in the mid-
seventies when companies refused to produce swine flu vaccines be-
cause of liability fears - particularly caused by their inability to secure
adequate insurance - the federal government insulated the manufac-
turers from liability. 4 1 Similarly, the government has absorbed part of
Nearly forty malpractice insurance companies were formed between 1975 and
1982 with the sponsorship of state medical societies and other physician groups.
Eleven state hospital associations also formed insurance companies, either in the
United States or "offshore." In part, these companies were formed to replace
lost coverage in states where commercial companies had withdrawn entirely from
the market.... These companies have made primary insurance available to doc-
tors and hospitals in nearly all parts of the country.
Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37,
39 (1986).
For a report on alternatives that may reduce the "malpractice crisis" faced by doctors,
see Browning, Doctors and Lawyers Face Off, 72 A.B.A. J. 38 (1986). For an examination of
the effect of high rates on other classes of insureds, see Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Munic-
ipalities, 72 A.B.A.J. 48 (1986); Goldberg, Manufacturers Take Cover, 72 A.B.A.J. 52 (1986);
Lynch, The Insurance Panic For Lawyers, 72 A.B.A. J. 42 (1986).
39. Hirsh, Malpractice Crisis of the '80s, 14 LEGAL ASPECTS oF MED. PRAC. 4, 5 (1986).
Although Dr. Hirsh found that physician-owned companies have been reasonably success-
ful, he acknowledged that these companies also are facing an affordability crisis.
40. To enhance competition, the government should facilitate entry into the insur-
ance market. Prices rise and fewer firms compete when market entry is artificially re-
stricted by government regulation. See P. MAcAvoY, FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION OF THE
PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE (1977) (Professor MacAvoy argues that deregula-
tion of the insurance industry should be considered). For the traditional view, see M.
RHODES, 2A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 21.1 (1984) (states have the power to regulate the
insurance business).
41. Congress, to ensure that the swine flu program would proceed, enacted legisla-
tion in 1976 to resolve the problem. See Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (amended
1978) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247b (Supp. 1987)). The legislation provided that
the United States, not the manufacturers or other participants in the program, would be
liable for all injuries caused by the vaccine. The United States retained the right to obtain
indemnification against any manufacturer or other participant whose negligence caused
the claim. In effect, drug manufacturers were made ultimately liable for negligence, while
the burden of strict liability awards fell on the government. In addition, the United States
[Vol. 64:4
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the higher costs of "DPT" vaccines. 42 In sum, if the market is allowed
to respond to the forces of supply and demand, and the continued man-
ufacture of some necessary products is thereby threatened, the govern-
ment will likely follow with corrective measures.
III. CONTRASTS IN COMPENSATION: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STRICT
LIABILITY AND SOCIALIZED MEDICINE
To better understand the efficiency and value of our strict liability
system, one must first examine a different system. For example, Eng-
land's approach to personal injury compensation is a substantial con-
trast to the approach taken in the United States. England has a "cradle-
to-grave" compensation system.4 3 If a British citizen is seriously injured
by a defective product, the government's social insurance program auto-
matically pays for the victim's medical expenses, drugs, prosthetic de-
vices and a portion of his or her lost wages. 44 Compensation is the
government's responsibility. The drawback of the British system is its
great expense since the cost of this compensation is paid by an enor-
mous tax on citizens and industry.4 5 Consequently, citizens have limited
disposable income, resulting in a gross national product far below that
of the United States. 46 England's high taxes also prohibit industry from
making badly needed investments.
4 7
In comparison with England's welfare state, the strict liability sys-
funded $230 million of liability insurance to protect the drug manufacturers against in-
demnity claims. P. KEETON, D. OWEN &J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY
356 (1980).
42. The Diphosphothiamine vaccine - commonly known as "DPT" vaccine - is
given to children to protect them from diptheria, pertussis (whooping cough) and tetanus.
Lederle Laboratories announced in May of 1986 that, to combat rising liability insur-
ance costs, it would nearly triple the price of its DPT vaccine to private physicians from
$4.29 to $11.40 per dose. Wash. Post,July 16, 1986, at 17. However, manufacturers have
made an approximate $80 million windfall profit from the price increases. The govern-
ment pays for half, or up to $100 million, of the cost of the DPT vaccine sold annually.
Atlanta J. & Const., Aug. 24, 1986, at 6A.
43. See Gibson, Products Liability in the United States and England. The Differences and Ilhy,
3 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 493 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gibson]; Plummer, Products Liability
in Britain, 9 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 65 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Plummer]; see also Samuel-
son, supra note 33, at 816-17.
44. Interview with Professor A. L. Diamond, Director of the Institute for Advanced
Legal Studies, London, England (March 17, 1984); 1 ROYAL COMM'N ON Civ. LIAB. AND
COMPENSATION FOR PERS. INJ. 48 (1978). Neither Gibson nor Plummer attach much weight
to the impact of socialized medicine on the non-development of British product liability
law. Gibson states: "For some reason, English courts have not been as reluctant to create
new criminal offenses as they have been to expand civil remedies." Gibson, supra note 43,
at 518. Plummer entirely overlooks the role of "free" medical care:
Unless a person injured by a defective product can invoke the terms of the 1978
Consumer Safety Act, or is fortunate enough to be able to convince a court he
should have a civil cause of action for breach of a duty imposed by a statute which
does not specifically provide for such an action, he must rely on the contractual
remedies provided by the Sale of Goods Act of 1893 or be able to prove
negligence.
Plummer, supra note 43, at 68-69 (footnotes omitted).
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tern in the United States is relatively efficient and inexpensive. Nonethe-
less, many product liability reform proposals have been designed to
eliminate strict liability.4 8 This is unfortunate because in some aspects
our existing strict liability system works as a free market substitute for
socialized medicine, supplanting the need for wholesale governmental
intervention in the compensation process. Our strict liability system
does not require a huge tax on citizens or industry to support it, since
only those found liable must pay.4 9 The costs of legal representation
are also borne directly by the private sector. Through the "en-
trepreneurial-lawyer system," representation of injured parties is made
possible by the contingent fee. 50 When an injury occurs, an attorney is
consulted, and the attorney takes the case if he or she believes it is via-
ble. If the attorney improperly evaluates the case, the attorney will re-
cover nothing and, in fact, may lose thousands of dollars worth of time
invested over a substantial period.
If the United States were to abandon its present compensation sys-
tem in favor of one patterned after England's socialized-medicine ap-
proach (and I am not suggesting this course be followed), there would
be little need for trials or for any strict liability analysis whatsoever. The
verdicts would be small. Few incentives for suit would exist, and most
damages would be compensated by the state. In contrast, our concept
of strict liability has developed over time to make it easier for consumers
to obtain compensation from manufacturers or sellers when injured by
their products. In so doing, the scales ofjustice have been slightly tilted
in favor of the consumer.5 1
Accordingly, the private sector must bear the resulting costs. In
many cases, the burden will be on the manufacturer or seller to either
obtain insurance or raise the price of the product, thus spreading the
48. The most recent proposal was Senate Bill 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986),
which was considered by the Senate during the 1986 term. See Hearings, supra note 13.
The bill provided a return to a negligence standard for product liability actions. See also
H.R. 5471,99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), which also used a negligence standard for product
liability suits. However, "[a]fter withering on the legislative vine since June, product liabil-
ity legislation has died on the 99th Congress." Starobin, Senate Product Liability Bill Killed
After Brief Filibuster, 44 CONG. Q. 2316 (1986).
49. However, others would argue that the cost of liability is borne by our entire soci-
ety, through distribution of losses through insurance companies and in the increased cost
of products. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
50. For a thorough discussion of several advantages provided by the contingent fee
system, see Schmidt, Contingent Fee: Key to the Courthouse, 92 CASE & COM. 2-10 (Jan.- Feb.
1987).
51. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 534-38 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS]; D. NOEL &J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 286-89 (2d ed. 1981). A lead-
ing strict liability case is Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (see infra notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text).
The . . . policy operating in [the evolution of strict liability] law is a clear recogni-
tion of the effect upon consumers of mass production and distribution of goods
and services aided by the mass media of advertising. The policy which the deci-
sions exemplify can be stated as an attempt to tilt the balance more favorably
toward the single or individual consumer injured by a vast impersonal merchan-
dising juggernaut.
Cowan. Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1086 (1965).
[Vol. 64:4
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loss, rather than the burden of the entire loss (often thousands of dol-
lars) being placed on an innocent injured person. 5 2 It is also more de-
sirable - and less expensive - from a societal view to have a product
liability system founded on strict liability rather than a compensation
system that is part of an enormously expensive welfare state as in
England.
53
IV. A CRITIQUE or REFORM GOALS AND PROPOSALS
The foremost goal of those who advocate product liability reform is
to shield manufacturers and sellers from liability.54 The theory is that
product liability suits cause the price of products to increase, and this is
supposedly undesirable. However, when product liability litigation re-
sults in higher prices, one of the most valuable components of product
liability law is actually functioning in an appropriate manner. Such price
increases act as a deterrent, 5 5 as a beacon to consumers that a given
product is dangerous, defective or has serious drawbacks. Aware of a
potential hazard, consumers then discontinue purchasing these detri-
mental products.5 6 Fewer consumers are injured; fewer suits are filed.
The system provides a meritorious economy. Manufacturers and sellers
seek to abrogate this valuable function when they advocate reform
legislation.
In addition, legislatively protecting manufacturers from the impact
of risk-taking is economically unwise. A natural component of business
activity involves the evaluation and taking of risks. Increases in the
prices of products - because of product liability losses and higher in-
surance rates - also act as signals to manufacturers that something may
be wrong with their products. These price signals should not be
blunted.
57
A second goal of reform is to eliminate strict liability and to return
to a negligence standard in product liability cases. 58 There are three
52. "The purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers . . . rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59
Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
53. Samuelson, supra note 33, at 816-17.
54. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 2. Reforms, such as caps on damages, elimination of
strict liability, presumption of due care and statutes of repose, were developed to protect
the manufacturer from suit, provide the manufacturer with a strong defense and limit or
cut off the manufacturer's liability. The intent is to reduce the amount the seller spends
on damages.
55. Deterrence is a major function of tort law. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 51, at 25-26.
56. A. Polinsky & W. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and
Market Power (May 1982) (working paper available from Emory University Law & Eco-
nomics Center).
57. Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or Buhvark of Free Enterprise?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REX.
313, 322-23 (1978). But see Comment, Solving the Products Liabilitv Insurance Crisis:.A Study of
the Role of Economic Theory in the Legislative Reform Process, 31 MERCER L. REV. 755 (1980)(ad-
vocates adoption of statute limiting manufacturers' risk to solve product liability insurance
crisis).
58. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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major flaws in this proposal. First, there are important differences be-
tween a cause of action founded on negligence, and one brought under
strict liability.59 Second, the creation of a "new" cause of action will
generate confusion over what it means and what remains of former ac-
tions. This confusion will take years to clarify. During the clarification
period, valid claims will be lost due to attorney and judicial misunder-
standing. Finally, the applicable standards and procedures comprising
our present product liability system have evolved over more than 100
years. 60 There is simply insufficient data for casting this system aside.
6'
Understanding the goals of those who advocate product liability re-
form helps to provide a partial insight into the dynamics of this issue.
To more fully comprehend the scope of reform's impact, however, one
must examine some of the proposals advocated.
A. Drawbacks to the "Double-Burden" Approach
The "double-burden" proposal refers to the plaintiff's double bur-
den of proof required in a strict liability action. One such approach
comes from a literal reading of Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts6 2 which requires that a plaintiff prove that the product is
both "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous.1 63 The Restatement
approach places a significantly increased burden of proof on the plaintiff
- contrary to the rationale underlying strict liability, which serves to
reduce the plaintiff's heavy burden of proof. In an ineffectual effort to
reduce the plaintiff's burden, the California Supreme Court, in Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp. ,64 ruled that a plaintiff in a product liability action must
prove that the product is "defective" and also the "proximate cause" of
the injury. 65 The Cronin approach, like the Restatement approach, re-
59. An important difference, then, between negligence and strict liability is, au-
thors have suggested, that in negligence the key consideration for the courts is
the major policies involved, that is, whether the risk exceeds the benefit of the
activity. In practice, however, the courts avoid discussing the policy questions.
Therefore, a distinction between negligence and strict liability is that in strict lia-
bility the court is asked to face directly the question of whether the risk of the
activity exceeds the benefit. This express weighing of critical policies in products
liability cases is the central theme of Escola, Greenman, and Cronin. The proposed
similarity between negligence and strict liability has existed only because of the
commentators' molding of negligence into something it has never been: a frontal
consideration of important social policies.
Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 Onio
ST. L.J. 61, 68-69 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Vandall].
60. For a historical analysis of strict liability in the product liability area, see Vandall,
supra note 59, at 62-65; Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Products: Past, Present and Future, 13 CAP.
U.L. REV. 335 (1984); 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4500.
61. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
63. Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286,
296 (1966).
64. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (the plaintiff in Cronin
recovered damages under a strict liability theory after sustaining injuries caused by defec-
tive safety hasps sold by the defendant).
65. Id. at 124, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435. Cases following the Cronin
approach include Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978) (Cronin approach applies to manufacturing defects and design defects); Hen-
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quires two fairly heavy burdens. A substantial flaw in Cronin is the "prox-
imate cause" requirement:
The term "proximate cause" is unclear and superfluous. Find-
ings of proximate cause and defect involve the same policy in-
quiries, and it is repetitious and misleading to ask whether the
defect was the proximate cause of the damage. The social pol-
icy question is asked once when the court weighs the various
factors to see whether the product is defective. It is confusing
to the court, the jury, and the attorneys to ask the same policy
question again, but under a different label, proximate cause.
66
Another "double-burden" approach was included under the pro-
posed Model Uniform Product Liability Act. 67 Under Section 104 of the
Act, the plaintiff must prove that the product is "unreasonably un-
safe."' 68 Clearly, the plaintiff would also have two burdens under this
proposal: to prove that the product is "unreasonable" and that it is "un-
safe." In effect, the end result is that the plaintiff must prove negligence
twice. This will confuse the jury and perhaps lead to unintended
verdicts.
B. Statutes of Repose
Numerous states have adopted statutes of repose as part of their
reform packages. Statutes of repose are sometimes confused with stat-
utes of limitations, but the impact of a repose statute is different from a
statute of limitations.6 9 Statutes of repose alter the torts system by pro-
viding a fixed period of time from the date of the original sale, usually
five to twelve years, in which a product liability suit must be brought.70
As a result, a product liability suit may be barred by a statute of repose
before the injury even occurs.
Although statutes of repose will prevent some victims of injury from
an old defective product from suing for damages, 7 1 the majority of
plaintiffs involved in product liability litigation have not been injured by
derson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974)
(wrongful death action based on theory of strict liability for defective design of crane);
Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 372, 154 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1979) (plaintiff
recovered under theory of strict liability for injuries caused by product lacking adequate
safety features).
66. Vandall, supra note 59, at 75.
67. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (proposed Oct. 31, 1979).
68. Model Uniform Prod. Liab. Act § 104 (1979).
69. A statute of limitations differs from a statute of repose; a statute of limitations
begins to run at the time of injury while a statute of repose begins to run at the date of sale. See
Vandall, Undermining Torts' Policies: Products Liability Legislation, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 673, 682
n.51 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Undermining Torts 'Policies]; see also Comment, Limiting Liabil-
ity: Products Liability and a Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 143 (1980) (statutes of
repose will bring uniformity to the limitations area of product liability, reduce uncertainty
by placing a limit on manufacturers' liability and lower insurance costs for manufacturers).
As of February, 1986, at least eighteen states had passed statutes of repose: Alabama,
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. 5 LAw. ALERT 7 (1986).
70. Undermining Torts' Policies, supra note 69, at 682-83.
71. Gingerich, The Interagency Task Force "Blueprint" for Reforming Product Liability Tort
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extremely old products. Ninety-seven percent of bodily injuries occur
within five years of purchase. 7 2 Consequently, a statute of repose will
have little effect on most claims. 7 3 However, there are several types of
victims on whom a statute of repose will have a devastating impact.
First, are those whose injuries are revealed years after the initial expo-
sure, such as victims of "DES" ' 74 or asbestos. 75 Second, are persons
who are injured by long-lasting workplace machinery.
In battles over the constitutionality of product liability statutes of
repose, ten states have held that the statutes violate the "open courts"
provisions of their constitutions, 76 while four states have held they vio-
late "equal protection."' 77 On the other side, four states have held their
statutes of repose were constitutional under their "open courts"
provisions.
78
C. The "Statutory Compliance" Defense
A popular reform proposal calls for holding a product non-defec-
tive where the manufacturer has complied with existing statutes.
79
Compliance with governmental standards is one factor considered at
common law in determining whether a manufacturer has acted with due
care. 80 However, to provide - absolutely - that compliance with a
governmental standards statute would create a presumption that a prod-
uct was not defective nor unreasonably unsafe would be an unfair de-
fense to a product liability claim. The likely result will be that
manufacturers will prevail when they otherwise would have lost due to
Law in the United States, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 288 (1978) (citing Task Force Final
Report, supra note 16, at VII-25).
72. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at VII-16.
73. Johnson, supra note 13, at 690.
74. Diethylstilbestrol - commonly known as "DES" - is a drug formally used for the
prevention of miscarriages. In 1971, the Federal Food and Drug Administration banned
the drug for such use because of evidence that the drug was ineffective in preventing mis-
carriages and was dangerous to unborn children. THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MED-
ICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 202-03 (1987).
75. Product liability claims arising from workers who were exposed to asbestos de-
cades ago have only been filed in recent years as asbestosis victims have become ill. See
Preger, Asbestos-Related Disease (Book Review), 6 AM.J.L. & MED. 390, 391 (1980); Richard
& Meier, Lawyers Lead Hunt For New Groups of Asbestos Iictims, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin,
Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
76. The ten states are Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Wyoming and Utah. 5 LAW. ALERT 6 (1986).
77. The four states are Hawaii, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Wisconsin. Id. at 7.
78. The four states are Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina and Oregon. Id.
79. For example, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act provided: "When the in-
jury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with
legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety standards relating to
design or performance, the product shall be deemed not defective .... " Model Uniform
Product Liability Act § 108(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,730 (proposed Oct. 31, 1979).
Widespread adoption of such a statute would influence both the availability of insur-
ance and the size of the premium. TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY, supra note 16, at 130; see also
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY POSITION PAPER No. 9 (1976).
80. Johnson, supra note 13, at 687; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra
note 51, at 233.
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the plaintiff's failure to rebut the statutory presumption of due care. 8 '
The defense of statutory compliance will discourage manufacturers
from developing safer products. To the contrary, the proposal provides
financial incentives for manufacturers to lobby for weaker regulations,
rather than to develop safer products.8 2 Opponents of the statutory
compliance defense argue that the current product liability system is one
in which decisions are made by institutions that are immune from polit-
ical pressure, such as courts and juries.8 3 Other institutions, however,
are not immune. It is well known, for example, that manufacturers fre-
quently influence administrative agencies to adopt less rigid safety stan-
dards.8 4 Because of this influence, manufacturers prefer to have
agencies - rather than courts - set applicable standards.8 5 If the statu-
tory compliance proposal is adopted, we will undoubtedly see weaker
guidelines resulting in more harmful products.
V. THE EFFICIENCY OF "Loss SHIFTING"
"Loss shifting" refers to the theory whereby an injured party is
compensated by shifting the loss and financial liability from the injured
party to the seller, and indirectly from the seller to its customers and
insurers. 86 The cost of loss shifting is thereby shared by hundreds of
thousands, not by one victim, nor by one defendant. The seller may also
choose to redesign the product, engage in research or drop the product
from its line.
8 7
Historically, courts were slow to identify loss shifting. Judges strug-
gled with the concepts of negligence, fraud, express warranty and im-
81. Compare Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348, 358
(1985) ("Compliance with a statutory standard is evidence of due care, but compliance
with the standard does not preclude finding of negligence for failure to take additional
precautions."), withJones v. Hittle Serv., 219 Kan. 627, 632, 549 P.2d 1383, 1390 (1976)
("Compliance is evidence of due care and that the conforming product is not defective,
and may be conclusive in the absence of a showing of special circumstances.").
82. Manufacturers have the power to influence the formation of government stan-
dards. Agencies often adopt regulations that are " rubber-stamped" versions of voluntary
standards already practiced by the industry. There will be no incentive to improve prod-
ucts since the existing practice is acceptable. Johnson, supra note 13, at 687-88.
83. Id. at 689.
84. According to the so-called interest group or economic theory of legislation,
market forces provide strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve
private rather than public interests, and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers
to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups. The wide-
spread acceptance of interest group theory has led to suspicion about much of
what Congress does, creating, in turn, a climate hospitable to judicial interference
with legislative outcomes.
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986); see also R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 271
(1985); Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82
YALE LJ. 871, 876 (1973); Forward to Green, Nader Group Report on Antitrust Enforcement: A
Summary, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 1 (1970).
85. Johnson, supra note 13, at 689.
86. J. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAw 229 (1981); R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW -BASIC TEXT
§ 3.1 (1971).
87. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962).
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plied warranty, but were sometimes seemingly frustrated because the
plaintiffs continually lost their cases. The watershed case in this area
was Escola v. Coca-Cola,8 8 wherein Justice Traynor, in a concurring opin-
ion, relied on loss shifting to support his theory of absolute liability. In
Escola, he stated that the loss should rest on the manufacturer rather
than the injured consumer:
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It
is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public.
8 9
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,9" Justice Traynor adopted a strict
liability theory similar to that previously suggested in Escola. Since
Greenman, courts have handed down a line of decisions with a unified
purpose: to protect the consumer. Recent decisions have emphasized
policies favoring injured parties: loss shifting, availability of insurance
and injury prevention. 9 1 This trend to shift the loss away from the in-
jured party and onto the manufacturer culminated in Barker v. Lull Engi-
neering Co. ,92 a decision which held that once the plaintiff has successfully
proven a primafacie case, the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer
who must demonstrate that the design benefits exceeded the costs of
avoiding the defect. 93 The expansive Barker decision was premised on
loss shifting and a desire to protect the consumer. It represents the effi-
cient manner in which victims of defective products are compensated for
their injuries. It is a policy which deserves to be maintained.
VI. CONCLUSION
Before any product liability reform is adopted, the relevant facts
must be uncovered and carefully examined. However, the search for
facts which would support the need for product liability reform is a snipe
hunt. We are told that industry is in trouble due to excessive product
litigation, yet we find that, in general, industry is flourishing. We are
told that insurance rates must increase or the insurers will be forced out
of business, but we see that in terms of profit, the insurance industry has
recently had gold-banner years. Also, few critical facts are available
from the insurance industry in regard to the amount of insurance sold,
the number of claims made, and the amount of claims paid. How can
legislatures intelligently pass reform measures when such crucial facts
are lacking? The answer appears to be that most product liability re-
88. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
90. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
91. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Pike V.
Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
92. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
93. Id. at 432-33, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
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form proposals are a result of the lobbying pressures brought by manu-
facturers, the defense bar, and insurance companies. 9 4 Unfortunately,
the present reality is that product liability reform is based on political
pressure, not facts.
The goal of those who would "reform" our product liability system
is clear: to shift the cost of injuries back onto the shoulders of consum-
ers and victims. In a country with socialized medicine, like England, this
would make sense because consumers would still be able to recover for
medical expenses and a portion of lost wages. In the United States,
however, it means that manufacturers and insurers would profit at the
expense of injured consumers. If the "reformers" are successful in
transforming their proposals into reality, injured parties will no longer
be fairly compensated. And such a change would represent a shameful
reversal of over 100 years of reasoned development in product liability
theory.
94. See Page and Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance "Crisis:" Causes, Nostrums and
Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 387 (1984) (the tort system is not one of the forces pushing prod-
uct liability insurance rates skyward).
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